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siderations. - IV. Summary.The title of my piece was suggested by Mr. Reginald Green. The
subtitle is my own desperate, or if you wish, cynical interpretation
of its meaning. There does seem to be a general re-evaluation of
what planning is and can do. India, by sheer size of its country and
problems, but also by priority in time and intellectual excellence of its
planners, has tended to dominate the field of non-Soviet type planning
theory and practice. It has been presented frequently as a model of what
planning meant. More recently, the difficulties and delays with the
formulation and acceptance of the Fourth Plan have been analyzed in
a conference and an excellent book on The Crisis of Indian Planning'
which has suggested my alternative title.
Remark: Paper pres. at the Joint Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association
(U.S.A.) and the Committee on African Studies in Canada, Montreal, October 1969. This
paper is later to be published in a volume by Mc. Gill University Press. I acknowledge with
thanks the critical help of Professors Ian Little and Paul Streeten, Oxford University, and
Elliot Berg, Peter Eckstein, and Richard Porter at the University of Michigan.
1 The Crisis of Indian Planning, Economic Planning in the 196os, Ed. by Paul Streeten
and Michael Lipton, Iss. Under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1968. Since the manuscript was finished a superb summary and analysis of Indian
planning, including an analysis of empirical studies has appeared: Jagdish N. Bhagwati
and Sukhamoy Chakravarty, "Contributions to Indian Economic Analysis: A Survey",
The American Economic Review, Vol. LIX, Menasha, Wisc., 1969, No. 4, P. 2, Suppl.:
"Surveys of National Economic Policy Issues and Policy Research", pp. 1 sqq.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv Bd. CVII. 1
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I shall continue to refer to The Crisis of Indian Planning as an argu-
mentum a fortiori: Indian planners "rely too much on bad data ...
over-emphasize the big aggregates of heterogeneous items, and neglect
detailed and concrete analysis of social and economic microcosms" 1;
produce sophisticated planning models with questionable connection to
facts; have neglected until now cost-benefit analyses in making investment
decisions2; and have pursued an import substitution policy at the end of
which foreign exchange earnings "scarcely cover the current demand
for raw materials and capital replacements"3 . Surely if this was wrong in
the supposedly more sophisticated Indian context, it is a waste of time to
seek an "improvement" in Africa by introducing similar procedures there.
My title is intended to suggest that whether there is a crisis and
whether there can or cannot be "comprehensive" planning, depends very
much on what one expected in the first place. If the problems are wrongly
seen it must be expected that the answers will be wrong or at best irrele-
vant, and the world being what it is, this will become apparent sooner or
later. If you think that perfectly real tough problems can be made to go
away by a process of logical incantation, you will necessarily be dis-
appointed, particularly if your logical incantations pay more attention to
internal consistency than to relevance to reality. But if you recognize
the very severe limitations of reality and would rather suggest a minor
improvement in reality and in the hard life of the ordinary African or
Asian than construct yet another elegant scheme, then perhaps planning,
even comprehensive planning, has an important place. I suggest that
what is happening is a crisis of planners; and what may hopefully emerge
is that attention is directed to the real problems of development instead
of the homemade ones of development planners.
Perhaps a tentative definition of "comprehensive planning" is in
order in this place. Since the rest of my discussion really is a more detailed
working out of what I feel the more appropriate meaning is, the initial
definition must be a little cryptic.
Comprehensive planning involves rational target setting and the
prescription of optimal paths to achieve these targets. It also involves a
way to deal with general interdependencies, preferable in a precise quanti-
tative manner. Such a definition is so general that one cannot disagree,
or be very sure just what it is one has agreed to. Differences come in two
major respects. The first is that one view of planning implies that one
can know and control the future. This has often the implication, secondly,
1 Michael Lipton and Paul Streeten, "Two Types of Planning", in: The Crisis of Indian
Planning, op. cit., p. 7.
2 J. M. Healey, "Economic Overheads: Co-ordination and Pricing", in: ibid., p. 171.
$ James Mirrlees, "Targets and Investments in Industry", in: ibid., p. 75.
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that planners must have the last word in everything and occasionally
even that they should be executors. When things go astray one blames
politicians and other unlovely creatures - perhaps imperialists or com-
munist agents, as the case may be.
Now, we can influence - more or less - the future, but it nevertheless
remains largely unknown and largely uncontrollable. I prefer to think
of comprehensive planning as policy formulation and decision making
with the knowledge that not only the future but even the present is
largely unknown; that compromises are essential - is not this the real
meaning of marginalism? - that decisions should be made by allowing
for as many interactions as possible; and that they should be made on
as detailed a basis as possible.
I. The Policy Irrelevance of Aggregative Models
Let me start with the widespread preference for aggregative planning
models. There are several related points I wish to make. The first is that
they all "rely too much on bad data." The other is that even when the
data become better than they are everywhere aggregative models will
be of very limited usefulness for decision making for the future (though
they may be very useful to explain what happened in the past).
(a) Modern economic growth, as Kuznets and others have pointed
out, is the application of science to production. "Science" is a method in
which assumptions and conclusions are continuously tested against reality.
Too much of what goes on in economics in general and in economic
development planning in particular is more akin to astrology than astron-
omy: there is the same emphasis on pseudo-scientific measurement and
models with the same lack of factual basis and true testing, and the same
lazy invention of data rather than collection by a tiring (not to say tire-
some) process of field work. Streeten and Lipton have stressed the undue
reliance on bad data, overemphasis of heterogeneous aggregates, and
neglect of essential detail. To this we should add the sheer invention of
facts and the pretense of knowledge where none exists.
This is a criticism that applies world wide. It is a criticism of methods
of planning as well as of specific applications1.
1 The Economist, London, September 6, 1969, had a page (p. 41) on American "Monetary
Glossary" problems: "Mr Henry Wallich has worked out ten separate definitions of the
money supply alone. Mr Paul McCracken said of the money supply recently ... that 'the
figures have fallen apart on us.' Mr Otto Eckstein said: 'if it really is the money supply
that is to be regulated, there had better be agreement on the figures ... who would rest
a policy on so weak a statistical reed?"
A. G. Armstrong and J. R. C. Lecomber, "Statistics for Medium-term Economic
Planning", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol. CXXXI, London, 1968,
I*
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Surely, when "only ii per cent of the 646,000 [Indian] villages are
connected with the rest of the country by all-weather roads, one out of
three villages is more than five miles from a dependable road connexion"1,
one is entitled to suppose not only that "the spread of new attitudes and
techniques as well as movements of physical goods"2 is impeded, but that
the knowledge of what goes on in the rural sector - in India as elsewhere
in the underdeveloped world much the most important sector - is likely
to be woefully bad. Indian agriculture in 1966 may indeed have contrib-
uted 115.95 billion rupees to a national income of 241.57 billion rupees3
or 48%; but the contribution might just as well have been 150 billion
rupees or 6o% (for example, if the planners and statisticians had less of an
"urban" bias, as Lipton calls it) or perhaps only 100 billion. Moreover, as
the OECD publication puts it4: "A large number of the basic statistics
pp. 45 sqq. (also University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, Reprint
Series, No. 290, 1969) point to the inadequacies of the statistical base for the British National
Plan. To take just a few quotations: "Important data were not available, existing data had
not always been adequately analysed, and there was a shortage of manpower involved
in the Plan. As a result, the statistical base was weak" (p. 46). "... there are certain
difficulties which must be overcome. (i) Census and short-period data are not always
compatible. (ii) Price data are fragmentary and there appear to be major inconsistencies.
(iii) Between-census measures of gross output at current prices and indicators of gross
output at constant prices do not exist. (iv) There are insufficient data on inter-industry
flows. (v) Even in census years the services sector is abysmally documented ... " (p. 47).
"The ... hypothesis [of] a proportional relationship between investment and changes
in output, while raising minimal data problems, not surprisingly exhibits little explana-
tory power" (p. 48). (Lovers of constant capital-output ratios please note.) "Crude esti-
mates of the future trend in invisibles - and capital items - can make nonsense of
sophisticated econometric studies of visible trade. Adequate analysis awaits adequate
statistics" (p. 51).
Lest I be deemed an obscurantist, let me quote Leontief: "The progress of economics
will have to be paced in the coming years by an increased flow of basic factual information.
And what I have in mind is not a gradual improvement in government statistics ... but
a shift of gear, the establishment of entirely new standards of excellence and performance."
W. Leontief, "The New Outlook in Economics", The Indian Economic Journal, Vol. XVI,
Bombay, 1968/69, p. 75.
Can any one doubt that there is not one underdeveloped country (and not many developed
ones, if any) that has more reliable statistics than the United States or the United Kingdom?
And can it really be doubted that planners must not rely too much on aggregates of doubtful
meaning, but must concentrate - as is argued further on - on detail even if it means grubby
and hard work to establish a reasonable base for their decisions?
1 Healey, op. cit., p. 164.
2 Ibid.
a OECD, Development Centre, National A ccounts of Less Developed Countries, 1950-1966,
Paris, July 1968, p. 144.
* Ibid., p. 140.
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available is derived from sample enquiries. The results of these enquiries
are often contradictory. Moreover, the relationship between the sample-
size and the universe-size is little known.
The estimates published by the [Indian Central Statistical Office]
C.S.O. do not as yet include data on private consumption, capital forma-
tion, and saving. Several tentative estimates were calculated for these
items by various official agencies and individual experts ... Extreme
caution should be exercised when using this information which is not
comparable to other national accounts data."
I am quoting these points at length for a number of reasons. The
first is frankly somewhat personal: it has been suggested that Nigerian
national accounts data, for example, are unusually bad, while other data
(Indian?, East African?) in the underdeveloped world are much better.
I suggest that such differences that do exist make no difference for the
problem before us, and that the Nigerian statisticians should not be
downgraded merely for being more open about their product and its
weaknesses!
The second point is less personal and hence more serious. We do need
quantitative economics, after all, because numbers do make a difference,
and sensitivity tests are obviously both necessary and useful. But you
cannot argue that the problem of data is adequately dealt with by making
such tests. If you find that results are not sensitive to variations in your
quantities, they do not seem very useful for policy making. But if your
results are sensitive to the data, you surely should not use them for
policy purposes unless you are quite sure that they are good.
(b) But I would go much further. Reliance on aggregate statistics
makes some sense for policy purposes, when the data are good and have
been built up for micro-data in a reliable manner, and when a general
policy decision can be relied upon to be translated by thousands of officials,
business men, consumers, peasants and workers into the detailed actions
that alone are reality. It would make little sense even if the data were
much better than they are, to use them as a substitute for policy. Thus
aggregate data are used to set targets for the economy and its major
sectors. Such targets are in fact "physical" even when they are expressed
in terms of money. Now it does make sense in some respect to set real
physical targets: so and so many hospital beds for adults and so and so
many for children; or y tons of phosphate fertilizers etc. But here we deal
not with this kind of specific physical or monetary target, but with
abstractions of little if any real content, such as "output" or "investment,"
whose very meaning depend on the precise knowledge of their composition.
The consistency of such targets become as irrelevant as the targets
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themselves. The aggregates themselves are concepts that cannot be acted
upon. They are at best summaries of past events.
This criticism goes also for the manner in which programming models
or input-output methods are used. First, the "sectors" are usually much
too crude, they have inherently no reality; there simply is no such thing
as "agriculture" as a policy parameter. Even a 100 x 100 table is much
too aggregated for policy purposes. Even when the data actually refer to
the economy in question rather than being taken from some other economy,
input-output data refer to interindustry purchases and not to technical
coefficients, and the purchases may or may not reflect efficient
operations.
If interindustry purchases are to be used for projecting targets and
allocating resources they ought to be economically optimal. When the
market works reasonably efficiently, they will be so within practically
tolerable limits. They will not be so when the market is imperfect or
significantly distorted by deliberate wage, price, or exchange rate policies.
Hence it is not permissible to use coefficients derived under such circum-
stances as a substitute for the market. Communist planning (which in
the past did not use prices as a planning tool) has always been conscious
of this problem and has substituted various input and output norms for
actual past performance - though not always with outstanding success.
The implications of these criticisms which are, of course, quite well
known, are several. First, the ideas which the aggregative models try to
quantify are important and must not be neglected: interdependences
are important and their neglect will cause trouble. But at best the methods
can be used to delineate only some targets for inputs and outputs.
Secondly, however, they can under no circumstances substitute for
either the market or deliberate policies1. The notion that there is a unique
1 I can refer to two examples. (i) Richard S. Eckaus, "Planning in India", in: National
Economic Planning, A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for
Economic Research, Ed. by Max F. Millikan, Universities-National Bureau Conference
Series, 19, New York, 1967, pp. 305 sqq., has a most sophisticated planning model of the
Indian economy. Alan S. Manne's criticism of the technical aspects do not concern us here;
Edward S. Mason's criticisms do. They are, in a nutshell, that the model is simply irrelevant
for policy making purposes, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
See also the survey of Indian planning by Bhagwati and Chakravarty, op. cit. - In
reviewing the model of S. Chakravarty and R. S. Eckaus, "An Approach to a Multi-
Sectoral Intertemporal Planning Model" (in: Capital Formation and Economic Development,
Ed. by P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Studies in the Economic Development of India, 2, London,
1964), Bhagwati and Chakravarty point out (op. cit., p. 14), that "one cannot be sure that
consistency necessarily implies viability." If, to avoid this problem, one "works recursively
backwards from an assumed terminal condition ... in all probability, we would fail to
tally exactly with the initial conditions" (ibid.). If I understand the models and the
criticisms correctly (and given my knowledge of mathematics, there may be a legitimate
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relationship between investments, or more generally inputs, and outputs
is faulty on several counts. The efficiency of management varies, and with
it the factor (input) proportions and the input-output relationships.
Efficient management will in addition react to the circumstances into
which it is put. If the exchange rate is wrong, it will use imported inputs
wrongly. If foreign exchange allocations are used, it will (if the proper
price is not charged) make matters worse. By now one has so many
examples from India, or the communist world, that one is embarrassed
to repeat the point. But it is essential to my argument: what will happen
will depend on these other wage, price, tax, exchange rate policies. Hence
they must be used to bring about the desired ends. Aggregated models can
at best give input and output targets. Direct government intervention
can at best insure the "fulfillment" of input targets - and that really
only for a few very large scale favored projects' while their "economic"
effect turns all too frequently out to be a more Freudian rationalization.
Output targets cannot be achieved in such a manner. Nor can they be
effectively set at the usual level of disaggregation.
Despite the fact that the criticisms voiced are really obvious and well
known, the planning methods are not considered to be just in an experi-
mental stage (as they would be if we dealt with an equivalent problem in
physics or business); rather, having stated the criticisms, one proceeds
anyway. The disillusionment is inevitable.
How can one explain that so much time is spent on methods whose
effectiveness has nowhere been demonstrated and which everywhere
lack an adequate factual base? On a psychological level one may venture
the explanation that they seem elegant, hence attractive; but also, as
the chief planner in one country surmised, they allow a flight from a
politically and socially intolerable reality. On a safer level for an econo-
mist, one may surmise that the various comprehensive and aggregative
doubt) this means that the models do not tell us whether what we want is feasible in the
real world.
(2) Joseph I. Stern, "An Evaluation of Interindustry Research on Pakistan" (Paper
Pres. at the Conference of the Harvard Development Advisory Service, Sorrento, Italy,
September 5-12, 1968, Development Advisory Service, Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Economic Development Report No. 120, mimeo.),
tested the performance of input-output analysis for errors in data, in coefficients, in the
level of aggregation, and compares results of the more sophisticated input-output
analyses with much cruder ones, which sometimes do better and never seem to do noticeably
worse.
When economies are wide open and relatively unsophisticated, so that one or a few
investments may change all coefficients derived from inversion, it is in any case dubious
whether the effort is worthwhile.
1 This probably accounts for the fact that they are so much favored.
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planning methods and models used or allegedly used in India and else-
where are considered to be the planning methods, the only ones appro-
priate to mixed and imperfect economies. Setting targets and specifying
optimal paths to reach the targets seem to imply the use of the aggregative
methods - or else there is nothing. Therefore it seems better to use them
and the data, however imperfect they may be, than not to use them at
all. It is the argument of this paper that this is not necessarily so. It is
one's respect for facts that should make one suspicious of aggregative
methods and aggregative data.
Of course aggregative planning projections are useful: but their
usefulness depends on the quality of the data underlying the aggregations,
the realism of the planners, and the adequacy of the policy prescriptions.
They are useful primarily to check the consistency of what it is proposed
to do. And there, too, the consistency will be meaningful only if the
aggregations allow policy conclusions to be drawn, if the data are based
on painstaking detailed work, and if the policy proposals are suitable
as well as feasible.
The main point is however not that the aggregative data are bad and
no substitute for policy. It is, rather that one cannot invest in general,
one cannot act positively in general. One can try to save in general, since
saving is a negative act of refraining from consumption. But investment
(and virtually every developmental decision) requires a positive act that
must take place at a certain time, in a certain place, and within definite
limitations. To link the general act of saving as influenced tax or interest
rate policy, say, to the particular act of investment requires, if things
are not to go wrong, detailed knowledge.
Investments are after all wanted for their contribution to future
output. Their value derives from that future output. To set targets for
investments or for future output becomes impossible without detailed
cost-benefit analyses. The aggregative models cannot tell whether input
or output targets are economically sensible1.
1 This is also the point of Ian M. D. Little and James A. Mirrlees, Manual of Industrial
Project Analysis in Developing Countries, Vol. II: Social Cost Benefit Analysis, OECD,
Development Centre Studies, Paris, 1969. Ch. i summarizes Vol. I, Ch. V, on "Plans,
Project Choice, and Project Design," pp. 57sqq., has a judicious discussion of the relation
between a plan and projects, pointing out, with British understatement hat "the argument
... that a proper analysis of projects itself requires good plans, can be overemphasized"
(p. 61). - The point is also developed in my Planning Without Facts, Lessons in Resource
Allocation from Nigeria's Development, With an Input-Output Analysis of the Nigerian
Economy, 1959-60, by Nicholas G. Carter, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.-- S. Chakravarty,
The Logic of Investment Planning, Contributions to Economic Analysis, XVIII, Amsterdam,
1959, implies as much on a much more austere level of abstraction in his Ch. VI ("The Model
in an Open Economy") and Ch. IX ("Prices in the Open Dynamic Model").
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This implies that a scheme that is suitable to describe and perhaps
explain the past, is not sufficient to make decisions about the future,
which is what planning is all about.
II. Disillusionment and Alternatives
One reason for the disillusionment with comprehensive aggregative
planning has been that after considerable efforts, underdeveloped econ-
omies are still poor, even if they grew - for a few years - at a satis-
factory rate, that actual growth rates fell frequently short of planned
rates; that the gap between rich and poor did not seem to close; that
many balances of payments showed no significant improvements1 and
even deteriorated even after all the "import substitution" that was
going on; and that all too frequently what happened bore little relation
to what was planned to happen.
i. Unsatisfactory Growth Rates
Leaving aside the uncertainties of the numbers2, why this emphasis
of planning for high growth rates in the name of accelerated growth and
in the face of substantially slower performance in the past? In criticizing
the draft outline of the Fourth Indian Plan, A. H. Hanson referred to this
unrealistic target setting as "idolatry" 3. I prefer to call it "hybris." A
number of explanations can be suggested, each of them in turn implying
a way of looking at planning that is bound to fail.
There is, first, the magnitude of the real problems. It is understandable
that compassionate persons should want to achieve high growth rates in
the face of a low base. It seems almost inhuman to suggest anything less4.
The case becomes even stronger when in addition to an accelerated
growth, other desirable targets are set. If the average income of the lowest
income groups is to rise fast, while at the same time there are limits to
the redistribution of income that can be achieved politically or that is
1 It is more than likely that the policies of import substitution necessarily contributed
to balance of payments troubles whenever they were planned without proper regard to
profitability. But to discuss this here would burst the bounds of this paper.
* OECD, National Accounts of Less Developed Countries, 1950-1966, op. cit., pp. 4, 37,
suggests that the numbers generally are so poor that reality may differ as much as 50%
from the given data!
3 A. H. Hanson, "Power Shifts and Regional Balances", in: The Crisis of Indian Planning,
op. cit., pp. 39 sq.
4 This is not self-evident. In the short run there may be a conflict between present and
future consumption. It is possible that a further depression of the existing already pitiful
standards of living will raise future incomes faster but that a compassionate person may
wish to reduce the sacrifices imposed upon present for the benefits of future generations.
Io Wolfgang F. Stolper
desirable economically (because supposedly only the rich save), a high
growth rate offers the best way out of this dilemma. The puzzle remains
why the practice of planning such growth rates continues in the face of
past inabilities to achieve even half the rates; or why planning for un-
realistic high rates should be considered politically or morally superior
to planning for more realistic lower ones.
I forego speculation on the political consequences of the disillusion-
ment that is bound to follow the raising of such unrealistic expectations
coupled with policies designed to achieve the impossible. There are
obviously other and more important reasons for unfavorable political
developments than bad economic policies. I feel certain, however, that
in many countries the economic policies pursued contributed to the polit-
ical difficulties: in Ghana or Indonesia, the patrimony was used up in a
vain attempt to raise permanently the level of production. The resources
needed to continue the development effort were therefore not generated,
and the "dynamic" leaders necessarily found themselves without the
means to continue their "dynamism."
Rather, I would point to a fundamental economic difficulty with such
attempts at perspective planning. Planning involves in this view the
belief, first, that the present is known; secondly that the future is know-
able; and thirdly that one can control events sufficiently to achieve the
knowable future. All that is in this view necessary is "the political will"
to translate into action what the planners have found need to be done.
By formulating the problem so bluntly, I have already indicated what
I believe is wrong with it. The idea that a sufficient will can overcome
any obstacles, quickly and almost without caring about the rationality
of the actions involved seems to me a belief in magic. First, the starting
point of the planner is obviously and painfully only very imperfectly
known. Planning models may be useful to clarify interrelations and to
teach economists how to work with numbers. It does not follow that, if
numbers are introduced into an aggregative model, one knows sufficiently
for policy purposes where one stands and what needs to be done. What
may be good enough for teaching, perhaps even for an explanation of
past developments, is most emphatically not good enough for decision
making that relates to the future.
Secondly, most of the future is inherently unknowable. Again this
obvious statement raises a number of questions. One cannot plan without
having some sense of direction. Contingency plans or rolling plans to allow
for knowledge as it becomes available are two possible answers. Yet,
the further in the future the targets are, the more vague they must become.
Specific technical targets are easy enough to set: x mil. kwh to be generated
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by 1980; or y% of all school-age children to be in school by 1975. There
is no difficulty about these kinds of targets, and "all" that remains are
the technical difficulties of justifying them economically and specifying
the path to achieve them!
A long-term perspective plan will include a few of such knowable
targets; a short-term plan should, of course, be crammed full with them.
In both cases, the specific content of the targets and the paths to achieve
them should be subject to revision. However whether the electricity target
makes sense depends on how it is to be achieved and what it is to be
used for; the rationality of the education target depends on its detailed
content, and is the more difficult to specify the higher the education that
is planned.
Most targets, however, cannot be so specific and physical. And the
paths to achieve them cannot be meaningfully defined by specifying the
amounts of investment in general. When the particular programs are to be
made concrete, as they must for action to be taken, what can be done
now begins to loom very large, and present bottlenecks determine what
can be done. Moreover, the prediction of bottlenecks becomes essential,
and by the time one has overcome them, one may have arrived at a quite
different place from the one planned for - and if technologies have
changed, one may be glad one did.
This means, first, that no path may exist from the present to the
planned future target, though if the path is not worked out in great
detail on a micro level, the planner may not be aware of the phantom
nature of the path! It means, secondly, that one need indeed specify the
distant future only most generally. But this implies, thirdly, that when
it is to be decided just what has to be done specifically, one can and
indeed must largely ignore such targets as that savings are to be raised
to x% and investments to y%, and even that investments in a "sector"
are to be z million dollars. Overall aggregative planning neglects the time
relationship inherent in changing anything. It usually says nothing about
such facts of life as that savings in period 3 can be achieved only if certain
specific things are done in periods i and 2. Attempts to change reality
very quickly reveal literally non-dynamic thinking, since a time path is
the essence of dynamics. Such planning also tends to neglect the next
step in favor of a rosy future by pretending that one can virtually overnight
change the structure of the economy and with it solve the hard core of the
development problem!
The planning literature is of course not unaware of these problems.
The problem of the size of planned expenditures is dealt with essentially
by trying to match available resources with planned targets and by the
discussions on how to design an optimal program. The "dynamic problem"
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is discussed in connection with time lags arising out of different kinds of
investments, occasionally in connection with capital-output ratios asso-
ciated with different industries and lags.
But the decision problem is really quite different. In the "present"
time there is a certain limited knowledge of where one stands; and an
equally limited knowledge of what the available resources are; and a
limited knowledge of what could be done. Pushing out these limits will, of
course increase the range of possible decisions as well as the resources to
implement them. But this ignorance is inherent in reality. The only way
to reduce it - it can never be eliminated - is to work on the next step.
The only way to make a rational decision for the next step is to make
sure that one's decisions lead to an increase in resources and to ensure as
far as possible that no feasible and known alternatives are overlooked1.
The inherent uncertainty about the present and the future can be dealt
with by ensuring as far as possible that the future is not blocked. Using
up one's foreign exchange reserves while planning for increased foreign
aid and no improvement in the balance of payments is an example of a
likely blocking of the future. So is an investment pattern that recklessly
burdens future savings. Neither of these two examples need be nonsensical,
but they are clear and observable danger signals.
But this again means at least two things: some kind of cost-benefit
calculation must be made from the very beginning. Only if the net result
of a disposition of resources is more resources can there be growth. The
volume and pattern of investments can only thus be determined and not
by setting output targets which then are to be achieved by investments
calculated by means of capital-output ratios. For whether the output can
be achieved has to be determined in detail, at the same time when it is
determined whether it makes economic sense that it should be achieved
in the first place2 .
It means, next, that time path considerations become of the essence.
You cannot average out available resources over time. The resources
needed two years hence must be available two and not three years hence.
If they are not, they will not be available in the third year which presum-
ably required that certain things happened in year two. If you cannot
1 This includes policies that counteract the possibly stifling effects of "non-resources'"
on the range of choice, such as the existence of monopolies.
2 Bhagwati and Chakravarty point out (op. cit., p. 24, note 51) that "one of the major
deficiencies in Indian planning has been an inadequate appreciation of the need to analyze
critically the economics of major investment projects prior to their approval and execution."
The First Nigerian National Plan by contrast had only the crudest aggregative framework,
but considerable (though for various reasons still inadequate) attention to the pay-off of
the major projects.
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swim and have to cross a lake, it does not do much good to know that
on the average it is only one yard deep, if there are in the middle 25 yards
with a depth of 50 yards!
Of course, you could run down previously accumulated foreign reserves
or borrow to get through the lean years - provided the use of the reserves
or of the additional foreign indebtedness gives reasonable assurance that
the higher end could be reached in the specified time. In any case, the
needed information is not contained in the aggregative planning; it is not
contained in capital-output ratios. It is contained in reasonably thorough
cost-benefit analyses and detailed economic evaluations of specific projects.
It does not make sense to plan any physical target without such cost-
benefit type investigations because neither demand nor cost are independ-
ent of prices and wages.
In addition, the ignorance of the present and the unknowability of
the future require that a process of experimenting and learning is built
into the planning. Hanson comments scathingly on the strange habit of
(Indian) planners to assume that everything will go all right'. And, of
course, there is a strong optimism underlying Hirschman's approach to
development, which may be characterized as the theory of unbalanced
growth. But Hirschman's point is really different: development necessarily
proceeds in an unbalanced way (which is most certainly true) and the
unbalance will create pressure on the lagging parts of the economy, which
the successes in the leading parts have transferred into bottlenecks. But
if the "leading" part itself was ill designed or perhaps too far ahead, too
tightly planned, the response of the rest of the economy may be much less
certain. The "hiding hand" cannot always be relied upon to rescue human
frailty, and even less human conceit2.
Indian planners are in this respect no worse or better than their
colleagues in other parts of the globe. Yet civil engineers build in safety
factors of seven and in electronics they run at least 30%. We have recently
seen the success of the lunar landing. But to achieve it, continuous tests
were needed and one lunar module was destroyed in an unsuccessful test.
1 "... one is never surprised when some little back-room planning bureau in a Ruritanian-
type country comes up with a comically inflated projection of growth. But one is surprised
when planners as knowledgeable, experienced, sophisticated, and prestigious as the Indians
do the same - particularly when the failures of their past exercises in this genre are available
for contemplation. Yet the practice of setting 'minimum' objectives, realizable - if at all -
only on the supposition that the most favorable possible combination of circumstances
actually materializes, is .. evident ... " (Hanson, op. cit., p. 40). If Indian planners are no
worse than others, neither do they appear to be any better. A good argument can be made
that economic policies have, on the whole, been better in the supposedly less sophisticated
African countries than in Asia or Latin America.
2 Albert 0. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed, Washington, D.C., 1967.
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If the moon landing had been planned with the same tightness that
gets such good marks in economic planning, only one lunar module would
have been built, and the program would have failed.
The ignorance of social and economic data is at least as great. Costs
have consistently (and with only very few exceptions) outrun estimates,
and not simply because the general price level rose1. Demands have lagged;
complementary industries were not finished in time, etc. It may or may
not make sense to use "unbalanced growth" as a stimulus to action i la
Hirschman or to rely on the benevolence of the hiding hand; it makes
no sense to ignore ignorance and eliminate safety factors necessary to
overcome the inevitable failures.
It makes no sense to plan on an exhaustion of foreign exchange
reserves. It makes no sense to leave no leeway for raising tax rates in
emergencies and to plan budgets without contingencies. It simply is
wrong to assume that feasibility studies will be finished in the shortest
possible time, that world prices for one's exports will be higher than they
are likely to be. Every planner and policy maker can add examples.
A substantial safety factor is also needed to allow for the capacity
of the existing civil service and the corresponding personnel in the private
(or state enterprise) sector. A plan that cannot be executed is an absurdity.
Its supposed stimulating effect is shortlived, more the effect of alcohol
than of solid food. The quality and amount of the personnel must determine
what can be done and how it is to be done. This problem - which is
generally recognized to be central - is also ignored by the aggregative
planning from the future to the present.
2. The Difference Between Plan and Achievements
So far I have tried to sketch out the central limitation on aggregative
overall planning: that it not only presumes a knowledge which inherently
cannot exist but that it uses inherently nonoperational methods -
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. I have also already suggested
that for meaningful planning to proceed it is not necessary to assume the
1 This has been just as true for the American space program or some of the military
procurement programs as for underdeveloped countries - and for similar reasons. There
was no precedent for the moon landing, just as there is no real precedent for much of what
has to be done in underdeveloped countries. Obviously, there are differences: Dam con-
structors have accumulated experience, and geologists are highly trained scientists. Yet
no matter how many test holes are bored, when the foundation of a dam is built there still
are apt to be surprises, and grouting may cost a great deal more than expected. At the same
time, there are in both cases procedures of questionable ethics as well as of questionable
efficiency: see, The Economics of Military Procurement, Report of the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,
9 1st Congress, ist Session, Washington, May 1969.
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impossible; indeed I have stressed that it is necessary not to do so. The
analysis of the discrepancy between what happens and what is planned
to happen may shed further light on how planning may meaningfully
proceed.
It is obvious that what will happen depends on what one does, and
not on what one plans. "One" refers both to the Government which sets
targets and executes some of them directly through Government-owned
enterprises; but which executes most of them through policies. "One"
refers, however, also to all the people who are to be affected by the Govern-
mental policies and they, too, may be managers of Government enter-
prises or private persons.
Now it is again comparatively easy to execute specific physical targets,
such as the construction of a dam or a mill. All you have to do is to hire
a foreign contractor or engage in turnkey operations. It is already with
such targets very difficult to make sure that (a) they stay reasonably
within the cost estimates; (b) they are finished reasonably on time; and
(c) they are reasonably profitable, i.e. that they fulfill their economic
purposes.
When it comes to the economy as a whole, good policies become crucial.
Such targets as the raising of Government revenue, the holding of expendi-
ture levels for non-economic or administrative purposes to certain levels;
or the earning of a certain amount of foreign exchange and the level of
desired import substitution; all of those are essentially economic targets
which cannot be executed in the manner of physical targets (like a dam or
a steel mill) and which depend on good policies - and, to be sure, a certain
amount of good luck for that part of the problem over which the country
has no control'.
Let me illustrate with three examples: agricultural policy; balance
of payments policy; budgetary policy; three areas that are at the very
center of effective planning, and that are closely related. Agricultural
policy is part of general "industrial" policy, but output is usually produced
by thousands of comparatively small units, and it is hardly possible to
engage in turnkey operations as a substitute for a well thought-through
action or as a short-cut to achieve an otherwise reasonable aim2 .
1 This includes policies of other countries. But it also includes future developments.
It is sometimes said that the spectacular economic development of the Federal German
Republic was largely due to "luck." No doubt, this is true. But it is really a very great if
somewhat unintentional compliment to German policy makers that they grabbed the
opportunities that arose. How many underdeveloped countries have shown such flexibility?
2 There are, of course, large farmers, and there may be examples of successful agri-
cultural "turnkey" operations though I am not aware of any one. But the failures of rapid
mechanization without the host of other policies, investments, changes in procedures etc.
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Agriculture frequently provides most of the export earnings; it
supplies most of the food; and it supplies most of the employment. And
it does all that for the foreseeable future. Clearly, whatever additional
sources of export earnings are developed, there is no sense in destroying
or neglecting those one has. Since the elasticities of demand for export
products are largely outside the control of a country1, it can influence
the price only through common international action. But it can do some-
thing about the productivity of particular industries (as was not or not
adequately done with Indian tea or textiles); it can make a price policy
that does not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs (as there is every
evidence with palm oil in Eastern Nigeria); and it can make sure that the
necessary inputs such as fertilizers, or spraypumps, or insecticides, are
forthcoming even if they have to be imported (as there is evidence in
Ghana that they have not been). Concern with fluctuations in raw material
prices and the elasticities of demand must not allow attention to be
diverted from improving productivity as long as the export earnings are
worthwhile; or from pursuing a reasonable domestic producer price
policy, unless it can be clearly shown that uses of the tax implied in low
producer prices are superior from the standpoint of the economy as a
whole to allowing a higher farm income. It is occasionally implied that
the uses of the tax money have no opportunity cost, that peasants would
have "wasted" the money anyway. I find this difficult to believe. Higher
producer incomes, even if consumed would have expanded the market
also for nonagricultural goods2 , while misinvestments burden the future
as well as the present3 .
West Africa has good export goods in cocoa or palm oil or ground nuts.
But even for tea in India, or sugar in Cuba, or coffee in East Africa -
that have to be undertaken to make it successful abound. The failures are all the more
surprising as the advocates of such a rapid transformation usually quote also Hirschman's
linkages and the rest.
1 Largely: something could be done by export campaigns etc. to increase the inter-
national desirability of the export product.
2 The arguments as found in reality seem to imply (a) that farmers do not save. In this
case it is implied that consumption as such is inferior to investments no matter how inefficient.
Or (b) that increased consumption may go for imports and hence provide no stimulus to
other domestic industries. This is a question of fact. But if demand rises sufficiently, it ought
to make economic domestic production possible. If it does not, the balance of payments
consequences are hardly a reason for not allowing higher incomes. Low producers prices
must be defended on the basis of the uses to which the taxes are put.
S This is true in a double sense. Most investments engender future operating cost. Even
if they do not - a road that goes nowhere can be allowed to deteriorate - they still represent
a misuse of resources which has reduced the productive capacity of the country below what
it could have been.
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the last two being commodities for which international agreements
exist -, a case can be made that whatever else needs to be done, the
productivity of export goods must be increased. It makes you competitive,
and at worst it allows you to withdraw resources from the production
of goods without reducing export earnings; at best it will make it possible
to increase those earnings.
When it comes to food, a country like Nigeria is probably much better
off than India'; this is not so clear for Dahomey, say, with its rapid
increase in population and meager resource endowment. At least, Nigeria
need not worry too much about feeding its population should PL48o food
cease to be available. Nor does it apparently have to worry too much
about a conflict that may arise between keeping the urban cost of living
low while keeping the earnings and incentives of farmers high: even the
serious disruptions caused by the civil war have led to only temporary
and local price increases of traditional foods in the territory of the Federal
Republic, and in normal circumstances the supply responses of farmers
with respect to traditional food stuffs appear to be quick and positive2 .
These are all problems in India or, apparently in Latin America, but also
in Dahomey and more generally in countries whose "industrial" and
foreign exchange policies have nurtured high cost economies whose
efficient integration into the growing world economy has been made
increasingly difficult by the very policies that were to solve that very
problem. In most African countries the problem is so far one of improving
the diet, perhaps insuring that increased incomes that normally go to
imported higher grade foods find an adequate cheap domestic supply.
Here, too, the Nigerian experience has shown a most encouraging feasi-
bility in substituting higher grade domestic for imported foods at reason-
able prices.
Any conflict between the urban and rural policies that remain after
reasonable price and wage policies have been adopted can be resolved
only through increased productivity. This is partly a technical problem
requiring research at all levels, partly an incentive problem to induce
farmers to adopt practices that have been shown to be effective. Involved
are "packages" with various time horizons, from very long biological-
genetic research into proper seed stock and the development of supply
and marketing channels, to the development of proper extension services,
to a tax policy that allows the adoption of improved practices, to a
foreign exchange policy that allows the necessary importation of fertiliz-
1 The socalled Green Revolution may perhaps have changed this.
2 The problem of general price inflation is, of course, another matter.
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ers, seed strains, insecticides etc.1, to a tariff policy that in the attempt
to reduce the importation of luxury cars does not at the same time dis-
courage the importation of utility cars and trucks, and so on.
I have mentioned already the quite well documented case of over-
taxation of oil palm products in Eastern Nigeria. There are well document-
ed instances of the wrong policies undoing the best (and sometimes not
so good) plans in Ghana, India, Turkey and elsewhere. Thus Lipton
points out that plans for agricultural crops bear little relation to past
experience in India because of the policies pursued. For example, sugar
production kept growing too quickly even though it was intended to
hold its growth back to free water and fertilizer for food grains2.
Something similar happened with sugar in Turkey: given Turkish
price policies, it is just too advantageous to produce sugar. And something
similar obviously happens in much soviet-type planning, where the
fixed plan prices induce managers to produce the wrong goods, even
when gross production plans are supplemented by assortment plans and
the rest.
In Ghana, huge expenditures on agricultural machinery reduced
output per man and per acre below even subsistence levels mainly, one
suspects, because the tractors were merrily used to clear land when no
thought had been given what to do with the land once it was cleared, so
that after a while it just reverted to busha. But the evidence accumulates
also that even in India, output per acre and perhaps per man is higher on
smaller than larger holdings4 while price and balance of payments policies
favor larger operators (whether private or state farms)5.
1 See the extensive studies on Nigerian agriculture made by Consortium for Nigerian
Economic Development (CNERD) at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich. -
Also J. C. Wells, Agricultural Policy and Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1962-68, forthcoming.
2 Michael Lipton, "Strategy for Agriculture: Urban Bias and Rural Planning", in:
The Crisis of Indian Planning, op. cit., pp. 1oosq.
3 This, and similar facts elsewhere - the evidence for negative value added in Pakistan,
or capacity utilization of 1o% and the like - suggest that much subtlety on models to
determine precisely what interest rate or wage rate should be used to value a project is
somewhat misapplied.
4 See M. Paglin, "'Surplus' Agricultural Labor and Development, Facts and Theories",
The American Economic Review, Vol. LV, 1965, pp. 815 sqq. - Lipton, op. cit., p. 1o6, makes
the same point, though more cautiously. - An excellent critical summary of Indian research
on agriculture is found in Bhagwati and Chakravarty, op. cit., pp. 29sqq.
5 At a conference at Glasgow in September 1969, Professor Hla Myint made this and
related points most forcefully. It is painfully easy to give examples. In one country I know
scarce foreign exchange is liberally allocated to the construction of dams and major irrigation
works (which are indeed executed with admirable efficiency) while the Government Depart-
ment that constructs the minor irrigation works and actually gets the water to the farmers
is starved. In Ghana, tractors for state farms were easy to come by while spraypumps for
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I am quoting India because, if this is true even in that landhungry
country, it is obviously much more true in comparatively landabundant
Africa. Yet, despite evidence to the contrary investments are concentrated,
nay wasted, on farm settlements and workers brigades, tractors and the
like, as if such measures were magical incantations that make thinking
about the proper policies unnecessary. Yet on the whole, one is happy
to note that Africa has been much better on matters of agricultural policy
than other parts of the world.
The failure to "hit upon a combination of policies which will ensure
a high and sustained rate of growth in agriculture"1 in India and elsewhere
has, of course, other serious consequences. To the extent to which the
recent studies of Indian agriculture are correct and applicable to other
areas, the combination of high taxes on farmers and inefficient spending
of Government revenues outside the agricultural sector will aggravate
employment problems, even if the failure to raise agricultural productivity
and output has no other serious consequences for the economy.
Increased taxation of agricultural output will reduce its returns,
hence stifle incentives to expand, and in extreme cases lead to a with-
drawal from the money economy. Unfavorable foreign exchange alloca-
tions will reduce the incentives as well as the ability to introduce innova-
tions. At the same time, resources spent on ill thought through industrial
projects - or for that matter on farm settlements and similar projects -
cannot conceivably either create much employment or lead to imitative
adoption by farmers at large. The high wage policy in the cities defended
on the basis of "need," or on the grounds that they are not really high
because they really represent a family income2 increase a wage gradient
which leads to an accelerated flow of labor into cities.
If the projects using the resources extracted from the farmers are
well designed and economic they will at least not lead to budgetary and
private cocoa farmers were not. Fortunately, there are also examples of the opposite in
Nigeria or Pakistan. For an account of somewhat different difficulties which innovation
by small operators had to overcome, see Robert L. Sansom, "The Motor Pump: A Case Study
of Innovation and Development", Oxford Economic Papers, N.S., Vol. XXI, 1969, pp. 109 sqq.
1 Paul Streeten and Roger Hill, "Aid to India", in: The Crisis of Indian Planning,
op. cit., p. 342. - World Bank studies indicate that since 1967, when the book was drafted,
there may have occurred a breakthrough in this area. It may also be worth pointing out
that despite the failures, agricultural output in India did increase slowly over time.
2 I am not arguing that unemployment or urban problems can be solved simply by
proper price and wage policies. There exist population problems about which this paper
says nothing. The hard development problems consist in technical changes and modernization.
These are the real hard core of the development problem, and they cannot be solved quickly
or without pain. On the other hand the price, wage, exchange rate, and investment policies
actually pursued make the solution of the hard core problems more difficult, and may even
make them insoluble.
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foreign exchange problems. If they are poorly designed and noneconomic
- which is all too frequently the case - the resources will not generate
more resources in the future and will thus lead to a budgetary and foreign
exchange problem. Moreover, when "underemployed" farmers become
"unemployed" urban dwellers there arise additional problems of urbaniza-
tion, slums, housing, and health which cannot be ignored politically and
require further resources. The problem becomes aggravated when urban
services are subsidized.
The policy thus feeds upon itself: the unemployed must be helped as
cheaply as possible, food prices must be kept down, and the productive
sectors taxed. All of which adds up to a further reduction of farm incentives,
a budgetary problem, and an aggravation of both economic and social
problems. Urban problems become virtually insoluble without a proper
agricultural policy1.
Failure to adopt suitable policies necessarily has direct balance of
payments and budgetary consequences. In India, the reliance on PL48o
imports makes this painfully obvious. But the problem is of course
more general. In Ghana, food prices have risen sharply. Fish output did
not rise commensurate with the expenditures on the fishing fleet: hence
budgetary expenditures and no export earnings or import savings. (Mat-
ters have changed for the better in this industry since the fall of Nkrumah.)
The expenditures on state farms in Ghana or on farm settlements in
Nigeria have seriously burdened the budget, but since there were only
inputs which were paid for in cash but no outputs worth talking about,
the expenditures had to spill over somewhere, and they necessarily
aggravated the balance of payments problem. No "transformation" of
agriculture can possibly result from projects that have not been thought
through and from policies that are self-defeating. Only political troubles
can arise: for, sooner or later, the victims of the policies will revolt, while
the beneficiaries cannot indefinitely be supported in the style to which
they have become accustomed2 .
All of which points to the overwhelming importance of detailed
microeconomic studies on what to do, a careful evaluation of the real
cost, which includes the budgetary and balance of payments effects, and
of developing the required consistency from below on the micro-level.
I turn now to balance of payments policy. There are three aspects
that are interrelated: the exchange rate, export stimulation, and import
1 I have pointed this out in my "Social Factors in Economic Planning with Special
Reference to Nigeria", The East African Economics Review, Vol. XI, Nairobi, 1964, pp. isqq.
2 In 1969, there was trouble in Western Nigeria, as there was before in Ghana when
Nkrumah imposed austerity for nothing. In 1969, producer prices of cocoa were substantially
raised in Nigeria.
Limitations of Comprehensive Planning in the Face of Comprehensive Uncertainty: 21
Crisis of Planning or Crisis of Planners?
substitution. And all are linked closely to the budget. I shall not consider
the proper policies to be pursued by developed countries' (although I
believe that the criticisms of present policies are reasonable and that much
more could and should be done). At the same time, it remains equally
important that underdeveloped countries understand more clearly their
own policy options and the importance for their success of their own
policies, regardless of what developed countries do2.
There seems to be a tendency to defend and prefer overvalued exchange
rates. This preference appears to have many roots, some more rational
than others. Since most aggregative models do not as a rule contain
prices proper prices are not considered close to the heart of the develop-
ment problem. (This is obviously not true for programming models
designed to yield proper shadow prices. But those have other problems3 .)
Also, there may be a more or less subconscious preference for insulating
one's economy as much as possible from the world economy, since the
openness of the economy limits the freedom of action of the policy
makers in obvious ways while the same limitation on the freedom of
action emanating from balance of payments troubles can be attributed to
difficulties of exporting due to low elasticities of demand and foreign
economic policies (which may even exist) which in turn justifies the
inward looking policies and overvalued exchange rates as an apparent
way out. This has in essence been the justification for policies of import
substitution.
On a more rational level overvalued exchange rates are preferred
because they will keep the prices of imports down, and hence stimulate
investments which must rely to a large extent on imported capital goods.
They will also keep food prices down if food is imported or uses many
imported inputs. The effects on exports are played down. Apparently it
is not usually believed that exports could be increased very much any
way, and some other ways of export promotion such as bilateral agree-
1 See Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries, Washington,
D.C., 1967. Is it just a coincidence that about half of Johnson's book deals in fact with
policies of rather than towards less developed countries?
2 It may not be amiss to point out that tariff structures of underdeveloped countries
appear to be irrational, and that protective measures introduced on the assumption that
they are needed as a defense against developed countries, more often hurt other under-
developed countries. Underdeveloped countries discriminate as much against each other's
textile industries as do developed countries!
3 I have discussed them in my Planning Without Facts (op. cit.) where reference to the
literature can be found. - More recently, Peter Eckstein has raised similar questions in
his Accounting Prices as a Tool of Development Planning, Discussion Paper No. 2, Center
for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
February 1968.
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ment are used. This procedure implicitly assumes that the overvalued
exchange rate will maintain the terms of trade at a more favorable level
than the equilibrium rate would, and that the disequilibrium situation
permits larger imports than an equilibrium situation would. While such
a rationalization implicitly assumes specific elasticities and tends to
neglect other repercussions, it is at least not as absurd as the view that
prices really do not matter.
However, the balance of payments problem is aggravated. Exports
are made more difficult; imports are stimulated as well as misallocated.
This is a waste which has particularly serious consequences on the policies
of import substitution. There is evidence in Pakistan that import sub-
stitutes have not saved foreign exchange1. In India export earnings
"scarcely cover the current demand for raw materials and capital replace-
ments dictated by the existing industrial structure"2 which was planned
to save imports in the first place! There is evidence that this happened
in Latin America, where even in the comparatively successful Brazilian
case limitations on export earnings restrict import substitution policies3 .
Anne Krueger has shown that the "economic costs of the Turkish trade
regime suggest that twice as much output, in value terms, could be ob-
tained from new resources with a liberalized trade regime and an equi-
librium exchange rate"4. And unpublished calculations suggest that a
dollar spent on export promotion might produce about five times as much
foreign exchange as is saved when it is spent on import substitution. And
Nkrumah's industrialization policy obviously was a mess from the balance
of payments standpoint (as well as from others). Nkrumah started with
more than three quarters of a billion dollars in convertible sterling in the
bank at the time of independence and he left the country with about
$i billion in debt5 !
1 Ronald Soligo and Joseph J. Stern, "Tariff Protection, Import Substitution and
Investment Efficiency", The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. V, 1965, pp. 249 sqq.
2 Mirrlees, op. cit., p. 75.
8 Nathaniel H. Leff, "Export Stagnation and Autarkic Development in Brazil, 1947
to 1962", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXXI, Cambridge, Mass., 1967,
pp. 286sqq.
4 Anne 0. Krueger, "Some Economic Costs of Exchange Control: The Turkish Case",
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXIV, Chicago, Ill., 1966, p. 480.
b I have never been impressed by the "dynamism" of Nkrumah or by the argument
that not all he did was bad. Of course it wasn't! He spent roughly $ 13/4 billion in ten years
out of capital, plus untold millions out of current taxation. If you dropped £ 6o million a
year for ten years from trees you are bound to do some good. As Mr. Liebling said in the
New Yorker many years ago with respect. to a "dynamic" American: all he proved was
that if you inherit a billion dollars, you can waste a billion dollars!
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Nor is it so legitimate to take it for granted that primary or industrial
exports will not increase: they have in South Korea, Taiwan, the Ivory
Coast, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Malaysia. Indian industrial products
are said to be resold by communist countries, at lower prices, in the
West' which proves not merely that bilateralism is no bed of roses, but
much more importantly that one can export all right provided price
and quality are right. Ghana has hinted at similar problems with its
cocoa sold to the USSR2. Turkey exports window glass and small tools
to the US at a loss - but again the point is proven that exports will
respond if only price and quality are right.
A more thorough analysis than is possible here would have to allow
for further points. Some may be hinted at:
(a) A distinction should be made between primary (and more spe-
cifically agricultural) exports and industrial exports. Within the primary
products group, minerals will differ from agricultural raw materials, and
tropical from temperate zone products.
(b) It is argued at times that if most underdeveloped countries really
started to export, developed countries would place additional restriction
on their exports. This cannot be proven or disproven. No doubt, domestic
agricultural policies in all countries mitigate against exports of those
products from underdeveloped countries. There are also textile quotas.
Yet Hong Kong has overcome the latter, and all the evidence supports
the belief - though, since we are dealing with the future it cannot be
more than a belief - that future policies of developed countries designed
to keep industrial export of developing countries out of developed coun-
tries will be more in the nature of a rearguard action than a victorious
battle, and will at best succeed in slowing the advance, provided develop-
ing countries succeed in building up efficient industries. I find it very
difficult to understand why success in the past should be considered proof
of failure in the future! In addition, unrealistic exchange rates and haphaz-
ard tariff structures interfere as much with potential trade and specializa-
tion among underdeveloped countries as they do with exports to the
developed world.
1 Sydney Wells, "Foreign Trade: A Commodity Study", in: The Crisis of Indian Planning,
op. cit., p. 297.
2 Republic of Ghana, Economic Survey for 1966, Accra, 1967, p. 49, § 197: ".. . cocoa
consumption has to be encouraged in the countries where little or no cocoa is consumed.
This could be done if governments, especially of countries in Eastern Europe and Asia
would reduce taxes on cocoa, and in the case of the U.S.S.R. if reselling of Ghana cocoa
on the world market at reduced prices could be stopped." The same Survey contains other
hints and statements,
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(c) The inefficient use of imports due to overvalued exchange rates
and the exchange regime that goes with them tends to "maximize"
rather than "minimize" imports. The relatively high ratio of imports to
GNP or industrial production of underdeveloped countries is no doubt
partly due to the industrial structure that has been built up, i.e. to tech-
nical reasons that are the consequence of preceding economic decisions.
But inefficiency, as expressed in negative values added (which may have
more than one reason, see Stephen E. Guisinger1) means also, and indeed
mainly, that less output is achieved for given inputs than is possible.
Low import quotients (e.g., the Federal German Republic) may mean as
much high imports with even higher outputs, as low imports. To put it
paradoxically: free trade will minimize imports; autarkic policies will
tend to maximize them!
The overvalued exchange rate necessarily has repercussions through-
out the economy. Imports for industrialization may be cheaper, but the
markets for the industrial products are also smaller, as exports are penal-
ized and so the bottleneck of export earnings for internal expansion
continues with increased force. If subsidies are introduced to offset the
overvalued exchange rate, the budget and the savings rate will be directly
affected. If a shadow exchange rate is used, the purchasers of the foreign
exchange must be charged the rate in which case there is a restriction on
investments, but the Government at least gets the revenue.
What will happen to investments and demand will, however, depend
crucially on the actual rate of exchange and not on aggregative plans.
But the "actual" rate is either the applicable official rate, or a rate mod-
ified by taxes, subsidies and controls.
What is true for the exchange rate is true for all kinds of prices. Too
low prices whether for capital, foreign exchange, or transport services,
lead to waste. And this waste will necessarily interfere with savings. The
immediate proof is that it will cause budgetary problems. A deliberate
policy of import substitution is typically unable to offset the effects of an
overvalued rate of exchange and faulty prices in general.
For, what will happen, what sectors will grow, into what sectors or
firms investments will flow, how resources will be allocated, all this
depends crucially on prices within the level set by aggregative demand.
And how aggregate real demand can develop over time will itself important-
ly depend on how sensibly resources were allocated over time.
There is some talk about the relative unimportance of proper resource
allocation compared to growth. But this is either factually incorrect, or
it involves a peculiar and very restrictive definition of allocation. Of
1 Stephen E. Guisinger, "Negative Value Added and the Theory of Effective Protection",
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXXIII, 1969, pp. 415 sqq.
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course, if we take a stationary economic system in which there are no
net savings and investments but in which resources are misallocated,
then it is quite imaginable that the higher level that could be reached by
an optimal allocation in a stationary system is trivial compared with the
growth that could be achieved if savings and investments were allowed.
But, of course, if we start with a growing system, then allocation effects
must include all repercussions on savings potential and investment. In
such a case to deny that allocation is important is to neglect the effect
which a proper allocation of resources has on growth; the fact that when
the proper allocation raises output it will thereby increase the savings
potential; the fact that when the output is raised efficiently it will improve
the balance of payments situation and bring about an increased supply
of resources for further growth.
I now turn to the budgetary problem. I start with noting one peculi-
arity: planning models generally have remarkably little to say about
the budget. Everything is supposed to be "real" rather than "financial."
The budget is - correctly - relegated to the role of handmaiden of
development. But it is - incorrectly - treated merely as "financial,"
as providing tax revenue and public savings, with some consideration
of its function to insure the proper level of aggregative demand through
undifferentiated deficits or surpluses. The budget equation has tax
revenue items and current expenditure items, with their difference
called "saving." When insufficient saving is forthcoming there is resort
either to tax increases or to deficit financing.
With some exceptions, planners tend to assume that there is a nec-
essary conflict with the Ministries of Finance who are said to be "no-
Ministries," always obstructionist, always pointing out that this or that
cannot be done because there is no money.
Perhaps so'. Nevertheless, planners would strengthen their position
not merely by understanding Finance's problems, but by realizing what
the budget really could do for them.
In the first place, in virtually no country is it easy to find out what
goes on in the public sector as a whole - which is what models usually
mean by "Government." More precisely, most countries do not know
what goes on in that part of the public sector which is directly or indirectly
linked to the budget. In the second place, it is not always easy to find
out what is a surplus or deficit in an economically meaningful sense. The
administrative budget is mostly a rather haphazard affair. Thus invest-
1 In Nigeria the planners had to help the responsible and able civil servants in the
Ministry of Finance to restrain their minister whose exuberant spending nevertheless quite
frequently showed a cunning and almost instinctive appreciation not merely of his personal
but also of the economy's gain.
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ment items are frequently included among current expenditures. Non-
tax and non-fee revenues (e.g. revenue from the sale of property, occa-
sionally even from borrowing!) are among the current revenues; there are
instances of important items being completely outside the budget. This
means that in many cases, the contents of the budget are accidental and
explicable more on historic than economic grounds. In the third place,
the budget is not usually presented in such a manner that it helps in any
decision of whether to raise taxes; to cut expenditures and if so which;
to raise prices of public authorities and enterprises to reduce budgetary
deficits; and/or to borrow, and if so from whom. This means that the
budget is not an adequate tool for development policy.
In Western advanced countries, there is not much sense in distinguish-
ing between current and capital budgets, because Government is not
expected to produce most of the economy's savings; there may even be
danger in such a distinction if it leads to such proposals as to limit deficit
financing to capital or "extraordinary" expenditures. But such a distinc-
tion seems useful for underdeveloped countries, because Government
must contribute to savings. A current budget should, among its other
functions, be designed to make clear how well the Government does in
its savings efforts. A current budget that is presented as balanced is already
in trouble: it ought to have a hefty surplus. Policies about deficit financing
can only be formulated for the public sector as a whole!
Next it would, of course, be desirable to have some form of program
budgeting, but the experience in advanced countries suggests that this
is much easier said than done. Still it ought to be possible to present the
budget (a) by ministry (since it is the ministries that are the executive
agents); (b) by personnel expenditures vs. purchases of goods and services
(since this allows some hint as to salary policy); and (c) separating out
transfer payments, which could be further classified by debt service,
social subsidies by category (health, education, etc.), and economic
subsidies to producing enterprises, with the current budget showing only
operating subsidies. It would help to focus attention on the rationale of
economic investments and it would help to direct attention to the possibili-
ty of forcing the recipient enterprises to do something about subsidies;
that is, it would help focus attention on the question of public price policy
as an alterno+ive to tax policy, and management problems as an alternative
to price and tax policies.
Why all this trouble? Obviously purely fiscal planning cannot be
expected to solve all problems. The relations between the Budget and the
Plan are complicated, the Plan providing the rationale for the Budget,
and the budget providing an unavoidable limit to what can be done as
well as the final place where the choices before the policy-maker become
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obvious and inescapable. In any case, it seems only reasonable that
whenever Government is given such a crucial role in development, it
ought at least to know what goes on in the public sector.
Beyond that it must be realized that the budget can tell planners
a great deal about the success and failure of past decisions, and about the
rationality of future ones. The choice between price and tax policy is a
major one in underdeveloped countries, more so than the choice between
fiscal and monetary policy. How often it is argued that industry is prefer-
able to agriculture or capital-intensive to labor-intensive methods of
production because they contribute more to savings. But whether that is
true or not depends on the surpluses materializing in the first place.
How often it is argued that there is a difference between social and "pri-
vate" profitability - I put private in quotes to indicate that it really
refers to all producing enterprises including state-owned ones - in order
to propose subsidies or low prices. But whether this makes sense or not
will ultimately come out in the budget. If it makes sense, taxable capacity
ought to increase in some reasonable period of time, hence revenues
should also rise without increases in rates. If that has not happened over
a few years, the argument, whatever its validity in abstracto, made the
wrong factual assumptions.
I have argued elsewhere' that the current expenditures engendered
by capital projects ought to be a major determinant of the size of invest-
ments in the social sectors, where economic calculations proper are
exceedingly difficult to make. The usual cost-benefit calculations of
education, say, can be.criticized on the grounds that they assume a growth
in the economy which the reduced budget surpluses resulting from future
current expenditures make impossible. The argument is "simply" that
working out future budgets and savings is both an essential and a valid
means of generalizing cost-benefit calculations. That this is not usually
done is attested, for example, by the case of Indian planning. Again,
substituting assumed overall rates of growth is no substitute for the
painstaking analysis of the future budgetary implications of present
spending patterns. If planners did that, they might perhaps find the
Ministry of Finance their ally rather than their foe.
But I would go further in two respects. In most underdeveloped
countries, the Government dominates the labor market both as to numbers
and wage levels2. Budgets are heavily weighted by salary expenditures.
1In my Planning Without Facts, op. cit.
$ I am referring to the market for wage and salaried labor. Self-employed labor will be
only indirectly affected. Wage labor in peasant agriculture will be also affected even when
it is at the periphery of the labor market, the Government wage rate having an influence
throughout the economy much as the steel price has in the United States.
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This may be the result of an overexpanded and useless civil service,
riddled with tribalism and nepotism. But the civil service problem arises
even if there is no overstaffing. The issue is that wages policy has a direct
influence on the budget, hence on Government savings, and on the rest
of the economy, hence on the demand for labor. The country may simply
not be able to afford even an efficient civil service unless the salary
scales bear a much more reasonable relation to average incomes and
tax revenues than they do, usually as the result of an inherited colonial
structure1. Whatever can be said for or against manpower planning and
budgeting, it is certain that neither educational nor manpower policy
can be meaningfully made without regard to the labor market and wage
rates. The budget should give planners important clues in both respects.
In general, the budget is the place where all Governmental and private
decisions come together. For the Government this is obvious: here the
final hard choices have to be made when resources are scarce. But I believe
the budget also tells something about the effectiveness of all Governmental
and private investment decisions through the growth (or lack thereof)
of taxable capacity, through the growth of current expenditures in
undesirable directions and at unforeseen rates such as the growth of
implicit or explicit subsidies; through the failure of the nonbudgetary
part of the public sector to contribute sufficiently to the growth of taxable
capacity and its all too frequent habit to need operating subsidies from
the budget. In the budget it becomes obvious whether policies have
worked, whether the expenditure pattern on individual projects of all
descriptions taken together have achieved their desired aims. Planners
had better learn how to read and use the budget as an allocative device
and an essential aid in formulating policy.
III. Administrative Considerations
Finally, I wish to make two brief remarks concerning the administrative
limitations on planning. The one is obvious: if you do not have the man-
power to execute decisions, the decisions do not do much good. Hence
what can be done will depend crucially on the quality and quantity of the
1 I have seen "expert" reports (I hasten to say, not in Nigeria) which have investigated
(on the basis of manpower figures "needed") how many civil servants could be spared,
and came to the result that only about 3% of salary expenditures could be saved by the
dismissal of a few low-power and low-paid people. Salary structures were not even considered
worthy of investigation, or else treated as a politically too hot potato! On the other hand,
there are cases where holding the line over the past six to ten years has in fact reduced the
privileged position of the civil service, and in some places (e.g. Malta) the extent of self-help
in the form of accepting a low salary structure is truly impressive.
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administrative apparatus. Indirection is a means of stretching its capacity.
Increasing administrative efficiency is important, but that includes its
capability of formulating workable policies which will achieve their
desired aims with minimal cost.
Increasing efficiency cannot, from the economic standpoint, be
identical with improving the effectiveness of a civil service without
regard to the economic policies to be implemented. The worst possible
combination is an efficient civil service enforcing a foolish policy. Not
much better is a civil service which does not understand how indirection
works and sees efficiency merely as a comprehensive system of permissions
to be given, quickly and impartially, by an all-wise, but also all-powerful,
bureaucracy. Power can be real even if it is not seen. But too few admin-
istrators at the top seem to understand this.
This is a general problem. Even if it were solved, a second problem
would remain. Comprehensive planners tend to assume that comprehensive
planning is possible only if they are firmly in the driver's seat. At times
they want to be executors, at all times they want the final say in all
economic matters. Frequently the organization of the Indian Planning
Commission under Nehru is put up as an example of how things should be
done.
The point is logical, but not necessarily valid. Political decisions must
be made by the political process regardless of the form of Government.
Planners are technicians; they should not be technocrats as well. Bringing
in the political level at an early stage may or may not be to the good. But
planners should present the political decision makers with clear choices
that express the economic gains and cost of each. They should not try to
outguess the statesmen and become themselves involved in the final
decisions which must be made both on economic and on other grounds.
They would thereby compromise one of their major functions in which
they are eminently competent, namely to point out the economic cost of
non-economic decisions.
If planners try to become executors, the question necessarily arises:
what do the executive (substantive) ministries do? It is inevitable that
the planners would in such a case get the whole Government set against
them, or else they would simply duplicate the rest of the Government.
This would not merely be a waste of scarce manpower, it would not solve
anything. To the extent that conflicts are purely personal, a centralization
of decision-making would get rid of them. But most important conflicts
have their roots in a recalcitrant reality. If so, the perfectly real conflicts
would simply be centralized, which might even paralyze the planners
into a failure to make the necessary decisions. If, on the other hand,
planners did their proper job honestly, without trying to play games,
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their influence could grow even as their power waned. Their function
should be a combination of the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of
Economic Advisors.
IV. Summary
I can summarize my argument quickly. Uncertainties about the
present position and possibilities and about the future are inherent in the
real world, and no amount of improvement in statistics or computers
will change this. The executive capacity of every administrative service is
limited. By definition, the better it is, the more there is to do; almost by
definition one has never enough. The brain drain from less to more de-
veloped countries should be sufficient proof of this assertion. Were this
not so, there would be no problem. There is every sense in striving to
improve an existing situation which, being human, has its necessary
faults. But there is no sense in pretending that the limitations do not exist.
If comprehensive planning is defined so as to demand knowledge and
power that cannot exist, it is obviously impossible. Much aggregative
planning and many logically persuasive planning models have come to
grief on the recalcitrance of reality, and there is disillusionment with
comprehensive planning. In this sense there is a crisis of planners'.
But there is an approach to comprehensive planning which allows for
the fact that planners are not God. By concentrating on detailed in-
vestigations, limiting the aims of planning to what can be done now,
using policy as the major method to get things done, and using the budget
more effectively, overall (even "comprehensive") policies for the economy
as a whole can be developed which allow sequential decision-making and
recognize both the need for time to elapse and the need to allow for
failures, to build in safety factors. If we have learned this, there need be
no crisis in planning2.
1 Professors Streeten and Singer have informed me that there was in the fall of 1969
a conference at Sussex with the title of "Crisis of Planning." I notice with pleasure the
parallelism of thinking of which I was unaware when I chose my title and wrote my paper.
I do not, of course, know what happened at that conference.
2 Mr. Streeten has suggested to me to add a section on how planners ought to be trained,
and to expand the discussion of how planners should be placed in the Government. Both
would, however, require separate papers. Mr. Streeten has himself contributed to The Teaching
of Development Economics, Its Position in the Present State of Knowledge, The Proceedings
of the Manchester Conference on Teaching Economic Development, April 1964, Ed. by
Kurt Martin and John Knapp, London, 1967. - Albert Waterston's Development Planning,
Lessons of Experience, Ass. by C. J. Martin, August T. Schumacher, and Fritz A. Steuber,
Baltimore, Maryland, 1965, has become an influential classic in the field. The OECD Develop-
ment Center has organized meetings on training and research, the results of which have
been published.
* *
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Z usa mm en f assun g: Grenzen einer umfassenden Planung angesichts einer
umfassenden Unsicherheit. Krise der Planung oder Krise der Planer. - Planung
umfaBt die Entwicklung einer Politik, nach der gehandelt werden kann. Aggregations-
modelle scheitern am Mangel an Daten. Aber Mangel an Wissen ist mit dem Problem
eng verbunden, da sich Planung auf die unerkennbare Zukunft bezieht. Auf3erdem
werden Aggregationsmodelle zwangslaufig in einer Art und Weise formuliert, die
kein praktisches Handeln erlauben, sondern ur nntzlich sind, urn ihre Konsistenz
in der Vergangenheit zu prnfen. Die eigentliche Planung muf auf detaillierte mikro-
6konomische Kenntnisse und eine sorgfiltige Formulierung der Politik gegrnndet
werden. Drei wirtschaftspolitische Bereiche werden im einzelnen erdrtert: Land-
wirtschaftliche Preispolitik, die auch fur die L6sung stadtischer und industrieller
Probleme wesentlich ist, Zahlungsbilanzpolitik, die wichtige Auswirkungen auf die
Allokation der Ressourcen im Inland hat, und Budgetpolitik, die die Ersparnis
beeinfluBt. Alle diese wirtschaftspolitischen Mal3nahmen sind wesentlich fnr die
Festsetzung der Lohne und andere Bereiche der Wirtschaftspolitik und haben auch
wichtige Auswirkungen auf die Allokation der Ressourcen. Es wird behauptet, daB
das, was tatsichlich passiert, mehr von bestimmten Preisen abhangt als von den
Parametern, auf denen die typischen Aggregationsmodelle aufgebaut sind. Zum
SchluB wird kurz darauf hingewiesen, daB die Planung den administrativen Fahig-
keiten des planenden Landes angepaBt werden muB.
*
Resum6: Limites d'une planification gen6rale en vue d'une incertitude gen6rale:
crise de planification ou crise des planificateurs. - La planification implique le
ddveloppement d'une politique 6conomique capable d'etre mise en pratique. Les
modeles agrdgatifs ne r6ussissent pas a cause du manque de donndes. D'ailleurs,
l'ignorance fait partie du probleme, puisque la planification vise l'avenir qu'on ne
peut pas connaitre. Donc, les modeles agrdgatifs sont formulds de maniere a ne pas
permettre la mise en pratique. Ils ne servent qu'a vdrifier la conformit6 dans le
pass6. Une vdritable planification devrait etre basde sur des connaissances micro-
6conomiques detailldes et une formulation soigneuse de la politique dconomique
a suivre. Trois domaines de politique 6conomique sont discuts en detail: la politique
des prix agricoles, qui sont d'une importance capitale meme pour la solution de
problemes urbains et industriels; la politique de balance des paiements, qui exerce
une influence importante sur l'allocation nationale des ressources; et la politique
du budget, qui affecte l'dpargne, est essentielle pour la ddtermination de la politique
des salaires et d'autres politiques 6conomiques, et qui, elle aussi, exerce une influence
importante sur l'allocation des ressources. On affirme que ce qui se passera en realit6
d6pend plutot des prix sp6cifiques que des parametres, sur lesquels le modele
agr6gatif typique se base. Finalement, on insiste brievement sur ce que toute
planification doit etre adaptee aux capacites administratives du pays en question.
*
Resume n: Limitaciones de una planificaci6n completa en vista de una
incertidumbre general. La crisis de la planificaci6n o la crisis de los planificadores. -
La planificaci6n entrana el desarrollo de una politica segdn la cual se puede actuar.
El uso de modelos agregativos no da resultado debido a la falta de datos, lo que
esti intimamente ligado con el problema de la planificaci6n por referirse 6sta a un
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futuro desconocido. Ademis, los modelos agregativos se escriben en una manera
que no permite acciones pricticas, sino que es dtil nnicamente para controlar la
consistencia en el pasado. La verdadera planificaci6n tiene que basarse en cono-
cimientos detallados a nivel micro-econdmico y en una articulaci6n exacta de los
objetivos politicos. Al tenor de dsto, el autor analiza tres campos de accidn de la
politica econ6mica: la politica de precios agricolas, que es importante tambidn
para la soluci6n de problemas de urbanizaci6n e industrializaci6n; la politica de
balanza de pagos, que tiene importantes repercusiones sobre la alocaci6n de los
recursos en el interior; y la politica de presupuesto, que influencia los ahorros.
Todas estas lineas de accidn son esenciales para el establecimiento de los sueldos
y otras magnitudes econ6micas. El autor afirma que lo que verdaderamente sucede
depende mis de diversos precios que de los parimetros en que se basan los modelos
agregativos tipicos. Finalmente, el autor advierte, que la planificaci6n debe adaptarse
a las habilidades administrativas del pals en cuesti6n.
Ri assunto: Limiti di una pianificazione di vasta portata in considerazione di
un'ampia insicurezza. Crisi della pianificazione o crisi dei pianificatori. - Pianifica-
zione abbraccia lo sviluppo di una politica secondo cui si pub agire. Modelli di aggrega-
zione falliscono per la mancanza di dati. Ma mancanza di sapere a congiunta stretta-
mente col problema; infatti pianificazione si riferisce al non discernibile futuro. Inoltre
modelli di aggregazione sono formulati inevitabilmente in una maniera che nessuna
azione pratica permette, ma cib e soltanto utile per saggiare la loro consistenza
nel passato. La vera pianificazione deve basarsi su particolareggiate conoscenze
micro-economiche e su una accurata formulazione della politica. Tre settori economico-
politici sono discussi minuziosamente: la politica agricola dei prezzi che e essenziale
anche per la soluzione di problemi cittadini e industriali, la politica della bilancia
dei pagamenti che ha ripercussioni importanti sull'allocazione delle risorse nell'interno,
e la politica di bilancio che influenza il risparmio. Tutti questi provvedimenti econo-
mico-politici sono essenziali per la determinazione dei salari e per altri settori della
politica economica ed hanno anche importanti ripercussioni per l'allocazione delle
risorse. Viene affermato che cib che effettivamente succede dipende pih da determinati
prezzi che dai parametri sui quali sono costruiti i tipici modelli di aggregazione.
In ultimo 6 richiamata brevemente l'attenzione sul fatto che la pianificazione deve
adattarsi alle capacity amministrative del Paese pianificatore.
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